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). Flexible exchange rates will allow the new member states to cope better with speculative capital inflows during the EMU run-up (Corker et. al. 2000) .
Given the arguments in favour of both more and less exchange rate flexibility against the euro, the heterogeneity of the CEE exchange rate classifications as shown in Table 1 is not surprising. Yet, exchange rate stabilization against the euro might be de facto more prevalent What about Central and Eastern Europe? Frömmel and Schobert (2003) argue that some CEE countries as Slovenia have adopted officially inflation targeting frameworks while implicitly adhering to exchange rate targeting. Given the approaching EU (and sooner or later EMU) accession, exchange rate stabilization against the euro might be more prevalent than suggested by IMF classifications.
The Rationale for Exchange Rate Stabilization against the Euro
The rationale for pegging to the euro is threefold. It springs from macroeconomic stability, lower transaction costs for intra-European trade and lower risk premiums for short and longterm capital flows.
First, most emerging markets and in particular the transition economies lack a history of macroeconomic stability. Based on underdeveloped tax systems and government-controlled central banks, inflation tax is a common means to finance government expend iture. Since high inflation and depreciation discourage private consumption, (foreign direct) investment and international trade, establishing credibility by macroeconomic stability is a key objective of every macroeconomic consolidation and transformation process. Exchange rate pegs-which help anchor both inflation and expectations-have been an important tool for this purpose, also in Central and Eastern Europe. For the CEE economies, whic h tried to stabilize inflation and public debt during the 1990s with mixed success, macroeconomic convergence has been a key element of the EU accession process. The EC Treaty states that the economic policies are of common concern and are to be coordinated (art. 103). Central bank loans to the government are prohibited (art. 104) and the member states must avoid excessive budget deficits (art. 104c). In line with this required macroeconomic convergence process, starting with the accession negotiations in 1998, inflation rates dropped and the gradual depreciation of many CEE currencies abated ( Figure 1 and Figure 2 ).
The restrictions on macroeconomic policies-and thereby the n eed for exchange rate stability against the euro 3 -will tighten even further after EU accession. De Grauwe and Schnabl (2003) explore the discrepancy between the Maastricht inflation and exchange rate criteria under the assumption of relative productivity increases (Balassa-Samuelson effect).
The second motivation for pegging to the euro stems from international goods markets. 
Formal Tests for Exchange Rate Flexibility
Based on the strong rationale for euro exchange rate stabilization in Central and Eastern Europe, tests for exchange rate stabilization at low and high frequencies are carried out.
Low-Frequency Exchange Rate Stability
Calvo and Reinhart (2002) use three criteria to test for de facto exchange rate stabilization:
monthly (percentage) exchange rate changes, monthly percentage changes of official fo reign reserves, and monthly absolute changes in nominal short-term interest rates. For all three criteria they set (arbitrary) probability limits to quantify the extent of exchange rate stability.
First, the degree of exchange rate fluctuations indicates stabilization efforts. If, for i nstance, the probability is high that monthly exchange rate changes fall outside a band of 4 Low frequency exchange rate fluctuations are defined as monthly, quarterly or yearly exchange rate changes.
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In the highly developed capital markets of the industrial countries an investor can hedge an open position in foreign currency through financial derivates (forwards) at low cost.
±2.5% (indicator ε), the currency is rated as freely floating. With a low probability the currency is classified as fixed.
Second, governments stabilize exchange rates by intervening in foreign exchange markets.
To prevent the domestic currency from appreciating (depreciating), the monetary authorities sell (buy) domestic currency in exchange for dollars, euros or yen. The stronger the efforts to stabilize the exchange rate, the higher is the probability that monthly changes of official fo reign reserves fall outside a predetermined band of ±2.5% (indicator ϕ 1 ). criterion ι 1 . This bandwidth seems primarily apt to distinguish between high and low interest rate countries. 8 As in most CEE countries the probability that short-term interest rates change by more 400 basis points from one month to the other is small, the band is narrowed to ±0.4%
(indicator ι 2 ). Table 3 gives an overview over the Calvo-Reinhart exchange rate criterion (ε), the foreign reserve criteria (ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 ) and the interest rate criteria (ι 1 and ι 2 ) and their respective bands.
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According to Calvo and Reinhart (2002) their probability criteria are superior to the use of 6 Official foreign exchange reserves not only change with foreign exchange intervention, but also for other reasons such as government payments in foreign currency and interest receipts on foreign exchange reserves (Neely 2000: 22). Further, the dollar value of foreign exchange reserves is altered if the dollar exchange rate of third currencies changes. Nevertheless, Neely (2000) argues that there is a positive correlation between changes in official foreign reserves and foreign exchange intervention with sharp increases in official foreign currency holding indicating intervention.
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For this purpose foreign reserves have to be reconverted from dollars into domestic currency which comprises a bias caused by changes in the dollar exchange rates of the CEE currencies.
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For low interest rate countries the probability that the interest rate changes from one month to the other by more than ±4.0 percentage points is (close to) zero, independent from the exchange rate arrangement. Out of the group of de jure free or managed floaters-the Czech Republic, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Sl ovenia-three countries seem to peg their currencies de facto to the euro. The Czech koruna (7.55%), the Slovenian tolar (0.00%) as well as the Slovak Koruna (13.21%) show a much lower probability that monthly exchange rate fluctuations exceed the ±2.5% limit than the benchmark euro/dollar rate. Although the Slovian tolar was allowed to depreciate gradually against the euro (Figure 1 ), exchange rate volatility has been considera- 10 The SDR's composition is 45% US dollar, 29% euro, 15% Japanese yen, 11% British pound. 11 Hungary started shadowing the ERM2 exchange rate mechanism in 2001 with a fixed parity against the euro and horizontal bands of ±15%. In June 2003 the parity of the forint was devalued by 2.26% to facilitate the way into ERM2 by higher competitiveness of Hungarian exports in the EU markets. 12 A footnote in the IMF classifications of Romania indicates that the de facto regime differs from the de jure regime.
bly reduced. This corresponds to the notion that Slovenia had been shadowing the DM before 1999 and is now shadowing the euro.
Only the free floater Poland (36.84% against the euro and 28.95% against the dollar) and the "crawling peg" of Romania (35.85% against the euro and 32.08% against the dollar) exhibit an exchange rate volatility similar to the euro/dollar exchange rate (38.46%) and can be classified as free floaters according to the exchange rate criterion ε. The standard deviations of monthly exchange rate changes support these results.
In contrast to the exchange rate criterion ε, the foreign reserves criterion ϕ 1 has to be interpreted more diligently, because percentage changes of foreign reserves can be biased by different stocks of foreign reserves. 13 When testing for the variability of foreign reserves measured in euro, for most CEE countries the probability that monthly changes of official foreign reserves exceed ±2.5% is significantly higher than for the US (40.38%) and the Euro Area (44.23%). But for Poland (23.53%) and the Czech Republic (33.33%) the probability is lower than for the benchmark free floaters. Romania (54.50%) is not identified as freely floating currency as suggested by the exchange rate criterion ε. The standard deviations of percent changes of foreign reserves yield a similar picture.
Measuring foreign reserves in dollars yields only slightly different results. In all CEE countries the probabilities are higher than for the Euro Area (13.46%). 14 But the probabilities of Poland (23.53%) and the Czech Republic (32.69%) are smaller than or close to the probability of the US (32.08%). Again Romania (53.85%) is not identified as a freely floating currency. The standard deviations of the monthly percentage changes of foreign reserves yield a slightly different picture ranging between 1.59% and 2.98% for the Euro Area, Poland and the US and between 4.59% and 10.63% for the remaining countries.
As the Calvo and Reinhart (2002) foreign reserves criterion ϕ 1 does not produce a result which is completely consistent with the exchange rate criterion ε, the indicator ϕ 2 is used to give additional information about the scope of foreign exchange intervention relative to the size of the monetary base. Additional evidence on the role of foreign reserves for exchange rate stabilization is
given by the stocks of foreign reserves as plotted in Finally, the interest rate criteria ι 1 and ι 2 are intended to reveal exchange rate stabilization via short-term interest rates. Absolute changes of nominal interest rates classified by a bandwidth of ±400 basis points (ι 1 ) draw a borderline between the high inflation country Romania and the remaining countries including the US and Euro Area. Reducing the bandwidth to ±40 basis points allows the identification of countries with extraordinarily sharp interest 15 Foreign reserves are reported in US dollars with no information about the currency composition. If exchange rates are stabilized against the euro, it can be assumed that the euro will have a considerable share in foreign reserves. Thus, the stocks of foreign reserves reported in dollars are affected by euro/dollar exchange rate movements. 16 Large stocks of foreign reserves might also indicate intended, future foreign exchange intervention. 17 During some periods as in 1998, when some CEE currencies came under speculative attacks, foreign reserves stagnated or even declined.
rate changes as Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland (compare Figure 4) . Again the Czech
Republic seems an outlier as the probability that interest rate changes are less than ±0.4% per month is less (7.69%) than in the US (13.24%) and the Euro Area (7.55%). The Slovak Republic (12.82%) also has a similar value as the US. The standard deviations of absolute interest rate changes paint a similar picture. To this end the interest rate criterion does not allow too reliable statements about exchange rate stabilization.
All in all, based on the low-frequency criteria as listed in Table 4 shows low exchange rate variability against the euro, this exchange rate stabilization is not reflected in the variability of foreign reserves and interest rates. In Romania, while the volatility of foreign reserves and interest rates is high, exchange rate volatility has been high as well.
High-frequency Exchange Rate Stability
High frequency data might provide additional evidence on the CEE exchange rate strategies. and the Romanian leu show the same cha racteristics as the euro/dollar exchange rate.
For a more formalized comparison of day-to-day exchange rate fluctuations, Table 6 reports the standard deviations of the daily exchange rate returns against euro and dollar for the CEE sample. The observation period is from 
The Path towards the Euro Zone
The tests for low-und high-frequency exchange rate stabilization as performed in section 3
yield similar results. Based on the strong rationale for exchange rate stabilization against the euro as outlined in section 2 euro pegs are much more prevalent in Central and Eastern
Europe than suggested by de jure exchange rate classifications. We observe a growing euro zone consisting of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. Latvia pegs its currency to a currency basket which is dominated by the dollar (45%) and the euro (29%). Only two countries-Poland and Romania-remain completely outside the euro zone. (Table 7) .
If a country has adopted a unilateral peg, for instance to the euro, the maximal value of 1 (100%) is attributed to the euro, and 0 is attributed to the dollar. If there is no information about exchange rate stabilization or the exchange rate is independently floating the value of 0 is listed for both euro and dollar. Further, if there is evidence that a currency is de facto pegged to the euro while de jure classified as free float-as in the case of Slovenia and the Czech Republic after 1999-1 instead of 0 is attributed to the euro. When the exchange rate arrangements or the weights in the currency baskets change, the values are adjusted in the respective quarter. Finally, for every quarter the arithmetic middle is calc ulated. The bold line represents pegging to all European currencies and since January 1999 to the euro. Up to 1998 several CEE countries pegged their currencies to the German mark or currenc y baskets which contained a considerable number of Western European currencies (in some cases ecu) as shown in Table 7 for Hungary. Representing the sum of the respective cumulated weights Figure 6 shows that the weight of the European currencies grew steadily up to 1994 and then by-and-large remained constant between 40% and 50%. After the advent of the euro in January 1999-despite the world wide wave of exchange rate crisis in 1997/98
and despite the shift of Poland to flexible rates-euro pegging has reached a record high in the new millennium.
With the first wave of EU accession in May 2004 the euro zone can be expected to grow further, approaching the 100% mark. As all new EU members will be expected to join ERM2 some time after accession (ECOFIN 2000), fully floating exchange rates as in Poland and pegs against anchors other than the euro as in Latvia will be incompatible with ERM2
(ECOFIN 2000). Romania will remain the only outsider of the CEE euro zone.
Furthermore, the rise of the euro zone will not be restricted to the new Central and Eastern European accession countries and the (still) EMU-outs Denmark, Sweden and UK.
Given the network externalities of a large euro zone as stressed by Portes and Rey (1998) the 21 A weighted average by country seize (GDP) would lead to a lower level of euro pegging since 1997 as the larger countries (Poland and Romania) have pursued flexible exchange rate arrangements.
countries at the periphery of the growing European Monetary Union might find it attractive to stabilize exchange rates against the euro.
As shown in Figure 7 which uses day-to-day euro exchange rate returns as proxy for exchange rate stabilization, besides the EMU outs also Croatia, Morocco, Norway, Switze rland and Tunisia peg their currencies more or less tightly to the euro. Other countries such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia pursue tight currency board arrangements or use the euro as legal tender. In Yugoslavia the euro circulates as an unofficial currency.
To this end, the euro zone already exceeds the scope of the present and potential EMU members. With the euro zone undergoing such growth, other countries at the periphery such as Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Algeria, Egypt or Turkey might reconsider their exchange rate strategies. The euro might challenge the dollar as the world currency.
Outlook
Based on a variety of tests for de facto low and high-frequency exchange rate stabilization, this paper has shown that Central and Eastern European exchange rate stabilization against the euro is much more prevalent than suggested by IMF classifications. Based on a strong rationale for euro stabilization, the euro zone in and around Europe is growing steadily. This implies a considerable degree of intra-regional exchange rate fluctuations which can be associated with higher costs for intra-regional trade and a higher degree of macroeconomic instability.
This leaves us with the question of a more homogenous exchange rate strategy in Central and Eastern Europe. As observed by for East Asia the common peg to dollar fostered intra-regional trade and macroeconomic stability. As shown in . 1: exchange rate arrangements with no separate legal tender 2: currency board arrangements 3: other conventional fixed peg arrangements (within a band of most ±1%) 4: pegged exchange rate arrangements within horizontal bands (at least ±1%) 5: crawling pegs (with small, pre-announced adjustment) 6: exchange rates with crawling bands 7: managed floating with no pre-announced path for the exchange rate 8: independent floating (market-determined exchange rate and independent monetary policy) 22% 16% 14% 14% Source: IMF: Direction of Trade Statistics. EU+ = EU 15 + Island, Norway, and Switzerland; CEE+ = CEE accession candidates + Cyprus, Malta, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Yugoslavia; CIS = former members of the Soviet Union except the Baltic countries; ROW = Rest of the World including US and Japan. The data for the single countries can be found in Table 8 . 
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